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Introduction: Energy Policy as a Two-level Game
The distinction between domestic and foreign policy has become more elusive in recent years. Growing political, economic, and informational interdependence has contributed to this development, as have the simultaneous processes of globalization on the one hand and the tendency towards economic and security regionalization on the other hand. In certain sectors the threshold between domestic and foreign affairs appears to be more fluid than in others. Energy policy is certainly one of those sectors where internal and external logics of action overlap and sometimes even contradict each other.
This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, domestic groups, which decide on the reelection of national governments, are interested in economic growth, something that normally increases a country's energy consumption, especially in developing economies. There are also international factors which influence these domestic needs. Thus a country's prestige and leverage within international organizations and global governance forums is usually re-lated to its economic performance and, as a result and indirectly, to sufficient and secure energy supplies. On the other hand, international energy reserves are shrinking and claims to existing resources have in large part already been distributed. Given that energy politics are barely regulated at the global level, "energy latecomers" such as China and India, whose aggregated energy consumption has skyrocketed during the past decade, now resort to the principle of self-help and compete fiercely for the remaining resources and reserves in order to sustain the growth of their economies (Rittberger/Kruck/Romund 2010: chap. 8) . In addition to the fact that emerging economies' increasing consumption of energy is likely to cause confrontation given the at best stagnating supplies, environmental concerns are also putting pressure on energy policies. During the last couple of years, the growing preoccupation with climate change at the global level has constrained national energy policies. Again, emerging economies, with their spiraling energy consumption and the resulting greenhouse gas emissions, have been the preferred scapegoats.
Thus, the overlapping of global energy and climate policies has already created a complex bargaining environment, especially for rapidly developing energy latecomers. Calls for the continuation of high economic growth rates and, at the same time, for the equal distribution of its fruits further complicate energy-policy choices for these countries. Their growing demand for energy makes certain foreign policy strategies, such as the conclusion of longterm contracts with energy-exporting countries and equity investments in oil-producing countries or countries with proven oil and gas reserves, attractive. But as claims in many oiland gas-exporting countries have already been staked out, the latecomers may not shy away from cooperating with so-called rogue states in order to enhance their energy security. This behavior, in turn, clashes with international efforts to isolate noncompliant states and fuels confrontation with established powers, particularly the United States. Two-level game approaches are most suitable for shedding light on the complex dynamics of bargaining as well as on policy formulation in fields such as energy policy where domestic and international challenges are highly interrelated.
According to the logic of two-level games (Putnam 1988; Moravscik 1993) , governments sometimes need to reconcile contradictory domestic and foreign pressures in the process of formulating and implementing policies. This is especially difficult when these governments face a relatively diffuse international distribution of capabilities and powerful domestic veto players (Alons 2007: 212) . Domestic power polarity, that is, the government's domination of society vis-à-vis societal groups and forces, is obviously less favorable for the government in democracies and federal systems, particularly when the interplay of governmental and electoral systems tends to produce fragmented parliaments and executives. The government's "transmission belt" function (Moravscik 1997: 518) , however, also provides it with certain advantages since it is informed about the state of affairs at both the domestic and the international level and can use this edge as an additional bargaining chip in relation to both domestic constituencies and international counterparts (Putnam 1988: 434; Moravscik 1993: 15) .
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When analyzing two-level games, it is advisable to treat an actor's preferences as "independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions" (Moravscik 1997: 519) . Because interest in India's energy policy is growing, an increasing number of energy reports and policy papers are being issued (e.g., Madan 2006; Joshi 2009 ). Helpful as these publications are, they usually take Indian preferences as given and then try to analyze Indian behavior and interaction against the backdrop of contextual factors such as the distribution of natural resources (and other material capabilities) or existing bilateral and international treaties. When we begin with the notion of preferences, however, an analysis can go in both directions: it can investigate either the formation of preferences before interaction or the impact of the specified preferences on the process of interaction. At this point in the debate, a theory-guided examination of Indian preferences may be the most reasonable contribution to the topic. Our findings could provide new input for future analyses of India's interaction with other international actors concerning energy issues.
We begin with a short literature review on preference formation and strategies in twolevel games. This serves as the basis for the empirical exploration of Indian energy-policy preferences. Our empirical research is based mainly on official and nongovernmental documents on India's energy policy. To conclude, we interpret our findings in light of India's domestic and foreign energy strategies.
The Formation of Preferences and Their Role in Two-level Games
Preferences are central to the study of international politics. They have been a constant subject of investigation as well as a cause of friction within the field of international relations (IR).
Following Jeffrey Frieden, the authors of this paper do not consider it useful to assert that actors per se (that is, preferences or strategies) matter more than environmental features (such as anarchy or the distribution of material capabilities) in international politics or vice versa.
Rather, we believe that it is the specific question that determines whether actors' preferences, the strategic setting, or the process of interaction itself should be treated as the dependentor independent-variable (Frieden 1999: 47-48) .
In general, the investigation of preferences can be carried out either inductively or deductively. The problem with an inductive approach is that mere observation cannot separate preferences from strategic calculations since an actor's behavior and statements usually reflect both (Frieden 1999: 45) . The problem with a deductive approach in our case is that no single comprehensive theory of national preferences exists (Frieden 1999: 53-54) . Traditionally, preferences are given more weight in liberalist theories than in other IR paradigms. In a seminal article, Andrew Moravcsik links different strands of liberalist theorizing by arguing that the study of foreign policy needs to include the ideational and economic sources of preferences which influence state action as well as the mode of representation which allows for some domestic interests to be more assertive than others (Moravcsik 1997: 515) .
In this vein, ideational liberalism stresses the impact of collective values and identities on the formation of foreign-policy preferences (Moravcsik 1997: 525-28) . Economic liberalism points to the importance of economic structures at both the national and the international level and to the role of subnational actors with stakes in the international exchange of goods and services (Moravcsik 1997: 528-30 ). Last but not least, republican liberalism concentrates on the aggregation of domestic preferences and the question of which interests are privileged in this process (Moravcsik 1997: 530-33 ). Moravcsik's account suggests including theoretical elements from the fields of international political economy and comparative politics in order to examine national preferences. This means that the study of national preferences requires one, firstly, to scrutinize the particularities of a country's political system and, secondly, to assess the country's position in the international economic and political order. Finally, these variables may be looked at not only as direct constraints to foreign policy but also as influences shaping domestic coalition patterns and regime types and, thereby, the process of preference formation (Gourevitch 1978: 882-900) . 1
To summarize, national preferences are formed at the foreign-domestic nexus and are exposed to both outside-in and inside-out dynamics, pressures, and constraints. This means that governments are "forced to balance international and domestic concerns in a process of 'double-edged' diplomacy" (Moravcsik 1993: 15) , that is, in a two-level game. The two-level game framework was introduced by Robert Putnam in an attempt to combine the "second image" and "second image reversed" approaches to foreign policy analysis (Putnam 1988: 430) .
He argues that during international negotiations, governments have to take into account the interests of powerful groups at home just as they do those of international bargaining partners (Putnam 1988: 434) . Putnam analytically disaggregates the bargaining process into two phases:
Level I negotiations take place between governments; during Level II negotiations each government seeks the approval of its constituencies for the tentative Level I agreement (Putnam 1988: 436) . The "set of potential agreements that would be ratified by domestic constituencies in a straight up-or-down vote against the status quo of 'no agreement'" defines the Level II win-set (Moravcsik 1993: 23) . Accordingly, the Level I win-set is the set of agreements that gain The last point refers to the so-called second image-reversed perspective. The fact that preferences can have both domestic and external causes as well as both domestic and external effects again highlights the analytical independence and priority which we attribute to preferences in this paper: preferences are to be kept separate from environment and to be specified before they help to explain (inter)action. Consequently, our focus on the actor (and/or its preferences) is an analytical choice based on our research interest and not a theoretical necessity. Theoretically, the characteristics of the actor that give rise to certain foreign-policy preferences and strategies could just as well be considered to be contingent upon the international environment or international interaction. Thus our findings are connectable in both directions: Preferences may be treated as independent variables explaining Indian behavior in international interactions concerning energy issues. They may also be treated as dependent variables caused by the nature of the domestic system. This very system may furthermore be treated as an outcome of international pressures, which are in turn created by the interaction of actors. and the larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap" (Putnam 1988: 438) . 2 This paper focuses mostly on the first stage of the bargaining process: the process of Indian energy preference formation and aggregation in the domestic context. Empirically we draw upon the content analysis of government documents and nongovernmental reports on India's energy policy. We order Indian energy-policy preferences according to the priority they are given in these documents. In line with this prioritization, India's core preference is to secure a sufficient energy supply in order to sustain economic growth and development.
Therefore, we first analyze how existing economic structures impact the process of energypolicy preference formation; second, we examine the ideational sources of Indian energypolicy preferences; and third, we scrutinize the institutional apparatus responsible for Indian energy policy. Last but not least, we outline how the preferences we have derived from the sources mentioned integrate to form an energy strategy and how this strategy might play out in the international context. For a comprehensive picture of the second level of the gameIndia in international energy politics-a deeper investigation of India's interaction with international partners and rivals as well as their stakes in the energy sector would be necessary. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The Impact of Economic Structures on Indian Energy Preferences
"Ten percent" has become something like an overarching mantra in Indian politics. It refers to the widespread belief in India that the country (only) has a realistic chance of overcoming its abundant social and political problems if its economic growth rate approximates the magic "10 percent" benchmark. Therefore, the Indian government's utmost concern is to secure energy at competitive prices in order to sustain an uninterrupted economic growth rate ties (Planning Commission 2006b: 49) . They calculate a fixed relationship between growth and energy demand, usually anticipating a 0.9 percent increase in energy demand for each percent of growth (ibid.).
India was able to pursue its version of import substitution and state-led development longer than most other developing countries because of its huge internal market. Its economic strategy coincided with the foreign policy principles of nonalignment, noninterference and third world solidarity, all of which are scrutinized in greater detail in the next section.
India's development strategy relied upon the tight control of the private sector and the dominance of public enterprises in key sectors of the economy: the heavy industries and the banking and insurance sectors. Enterprises in these sectors have been heavy energy consumers (Ahmed/Ghani 2007; Narlikar 2006: 63) .
With regard to the current market structure, India's energy production is still dominated by state-owned enterprises. Coal India, for instance, produces more than 80 percent of India's most important energy source, coal. Due to the high degree of regulation within the coal sector, private investors are rare. The oil and gas sectors are more flexible and therefore demonstrate more private activity. Reliance Industries is an example of a relevant private actor on the gas market. Nevertheless, state-owned enterprises such as the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Oil India Limited (OIL), and the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) are still the most important players. Electricity production is also largely in the hands of public companies such as the National Thermal Power Corporation, the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation, and the Nuclear Power Corporation. Public-sector companies also dominate the transmission and distribution of energy supplies to the end consumers (IEA 2007: 446-50 ).
The various efforts to unbundle the services of the state electricity boards according to the guidelines offered by the Central Electricity Board (established in 2003) have had mixed success to date. The same holds true for efforts to encourage private-sector involvement in the exploration and exploitation of energy resources as well as in electricity generation (Madan 2006: 37-39; Herd et al. 2007: 204-209) .
The dominance of state-owned companies, which are still not competitive internationally and are overstrained with domestic energy challenges, goes hand in hand with high energy subsidies, the overregulation of the Indian energy market, and its insulation against the global market as a legacy of India's mixed-economy model. Nonetheless, the liberalization of the economic regime since 1991 has had a massive impact on India's energy demand and strategy. Firstly, it has brought India to a higher growth trajectory, which has rapidly been increasing its energy demand. Secondly, it has opened the coal and oil sectors to foreign capital. Thirdly, it has altered the sectoral structure of the Indian economy because capital-and energy-intensive sectors have developed best. Energy demand has also increased because of the growing use of home appliances and cars by the expanding middle class. (Ahmed/Ghani 2007: 144-45; Razavi 2009: 5) . Among the BRICs, India will become most dependent on foreign energy supplies, especially oil (Scholvin 2007: 4-5) .
Natural gas covers an increasing amount of India's energy demand (today up to 7 percent). This demand is currently being met mainly by local sources, but imports will grow drastically in the next two decades. With regard to coal, which still accounts for the biggest part of Indian energy consumption, import dependence remains relatively low (IEA 2007: 445-45) . However, the low quality of domestic coal reserves and infrastructural deficits will make augmenting coal imports unavoidable. India is poorly endowed with uranium and extracts this commodity from extremely low-grade ores. In terms of nuclear fuels, the country thus has two options: either it enriches uranium in its own fast-breeder reactors or it relies upon increasing deliveries made possible by the US-Indo nuclear deal. It is not certain whether India's hopes of a rapidly growing share of nuclear power within its energy mix will materialize. 4 The construction and putting into service of new nuclear power plants has always trailed far behind the national requirements as set out in government planning (Friedman/Schaffer 2009: 1-2). When summarizing the supply side of India's energy policy, one has to state that India itself does not possess sufficient natural resources. The security of its energy supply will become an even bigger concern in India's foreign policy if economic growth rates remain comparable to those of the last five years and the boom in vehicle production persists (Planning Commission 2006a: 45; IEA 2007: 458-59, 463 ).
In addition, a successive structural shift from agriculture to industry, accompanied by the growth of industrial production, is also expected to increase India's energy demand. During the era of "Hindu growth rates" (3 to 3.5 percent annually) and even in the initial phase after economic liberalization, there was no peak in India's energy consumption due to the fact that the economic boom was mainly led by the service sector. But as the importance of the energy-intensive industrial sector has been growing disproportionably quickly since 2004, industrial energy demand is expected to increase accordingly. Given that the construction of power plants trailed behind planning even in times of economic stagnation, current developments must be alarming. In light of India's industrial growth rates since the year 2000, the already energy-intensive character of India's industry, and the persistence of subsidies and transmission losses of up to 40 percent, it seems inevitable that India will face a dangerous energy shortage (Madan 2006: 9) . The changes in India's economic structure have also altered India's energy-policy preferences through the new presence of foreign enterprises in the Indian market (although their profile is still underdeveloped). Furthermore, the sheer dynamic of the Indian economy in the last decade has created new opportunities for international cooperation. The interdependence of the Indian economy has thus increased-a fact which has also impacted India's energy strategy. Firstly, competitive bidding has been introduced in the exploration and exploitation of new coal, gas and oil fields. This reform has stirred moderate interest on the part of foreign investors (Madan 2006: 37-39 India's energy-policy preferences in particular.
Collective Values and Identity as the Source of Indian Energy Preferences
India's energy policy reflects a mixture of internal pressures and general preferences for a certain world order which have guided Indian foreign policy since its independence in 1947.
Sometimes these internal and external compulsions overlap, sometimes they contradict each other. Thus, a growing dependence on foreign energy supplies clashes with India's traditional foreign policy principles, above all the value of self-reliance, which is linked back to historical experience. Since its independence from British colonial rule, India has developed a strong anti-imperial identity and tried to minimize the influence of foreign companies. It was a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the time of the East-West confrontation and was one of the masterminds behind the movement which demanded a new international economic order to the benefit of poorer countries. India's strict anti-imperial stance has also included adherence to the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of countries that are considered to be partners (Mohan 2003: 268 ff.) .
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In the meantime, India has concluded similar agreements with Russia and France which are likely to have comparable effects (Friedman/Schaffer 2009: 2) .
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For a theoretical elaboration of this argument cf. Moravcsik 1997: 528.
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The influence of these traditional values is reflected in Indian energy policy, particularly in the preferences for exploring domestic oil, gas, and coal reserves and for expanding domestic energy production through new nuclear power plants. There is ongoing controversy over whether India's goal should be "energy independence" or "energy security."
Those who are most skeptical of an external energy supply, such as the former Indian president A.P.J Abdul Kalam, advocate a strategy to achieve "energy independence" by 2030 (Kalam 2005) . Most other actors argue that reaching this goal will be impossible. They plead for energy security instead (Madan 2006: 17) , that is, the "continuous availability of commer- From India's perspective all available fuel options and forms of energy need to be pursued in order to achieve the goal of energy security. This means that India aims to diversify both its energy sources and its supplying countries. In order to minimize outside influence, the expansion of competitive national sources is, from an Indian point of view, desirable In the next section we scrutinize the influence of domestic institutions on India's energy-policy preferences before we finally turn towards a more general assessment of India's energy strategy.
The Institutional Apparatus and the Aggregation of Indian Energy Preferences
Its 
The Integration of India's Energy-policy Preferences into a Strategy
The way in which India's energy-policy preferences have arisen in light of scarce indigenous resources, high economic growth rates, and energy-intensive industrial and agrarian production has been discussed above. Efforts to save energy have also remained limited in India.
Additionally, India's conflict with Pakistan as well as instabilities within Pakistan itself hamper the flow of Central Asian and Caucasian energy supplies to the subcontinent. It is also clear that India's energy-policy preferences are closely related to its overall strategic goal of sustaining economic growth while alleviating poverty. In addition to these general necessities, limitations, and ambitions, we have identified particular nonmaterial and material factors which also influence India's energy-policy preferences.
Firstly, the influence of the collective values and identities developed during the struggle for independence and in the early post-independence years is evident in Indian energy-policy preferences. Thus, the value of self-reliance figures prominently within the Indian energy discourse, sometimes even in the form of the unrealistic goal of energy independence.
Furthermore, traditional South-South solidarity and anti-Western resentments are still observable in the current Indian energy debate, especially in the skepticism regarding closer cooperation with the US and the relatively uncritical view of so-called rogue states in Africa and Asia. Secondly, India's energy market continues to be strongly regulated and distorted by subsidies and the dominance of public companies. Private activity is rare, although lately we have been witnessing the consequences of economic growth and a moderate market opening also in the energy sector. The trend of incremental augmentation of the number and amount of private and foreign investors is thus likely to continue. Thirdly, we have found that while the Indian government is very influential in the energy sector, there is a high level of institutional fragmentation. The government's aim of keeping energy companies under state tutelage and of steering the whole sector is-as in many developing countries-stifled by its inability to properly coordinate the relevant ministries and agencies. Thus we have detected a certain activism on the part of the government in creating ever more entities concerned with energy policy, but few efforts which aim at cohesion. This might weaken the position of the government when it comes to implementing policies. Nevertheless, the tight network of linkages in the sector between political, economic, and societal actors blurs the different ambits and might indeed improve inclusiveness and the assertiveness of the ruling elites.
After all, one must not forget that India is a democracy-though one with corporate traits. This means that despite the government's still-influential position in the economic realm and a relatively low degree of civil society activity, Indian policy makers are subject to democratic voting procedures and thus to domestic constituencies' opinions on energy policy. Here it is relevant that 60 percent of the Indian labor force is still employed in the agricultural sector, where cheap and unmetered electricity supply is the general rule. Additionally, many households only pay a small flat rate, and in some rural areas electricity supply is even completely free (Friedman/Schaffer 2009: 1) . It is obvious that the electoral weight of these groups is enormous. Thus, parties in different Indian states have often promised to maintain or initiate the provision of cost-free electricity before elections. The practically insolvent State Electricity Boards and public energy companies, moreover, employ a huge number of people. 10
Unions and leftist parties have therefore exercised stiff resistance to institutional reforms and any kind of privatization. Thus, to conclude this summary of the domestic sources of Indian energy-policy preferences, it can be said that the institutional effects on Indian preference formation appear to be the most complex variable at this point of the analysis, even more so because they are partially blended with economic factors.
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Coal India, for instance, is the second-largest employer in the world (Friedman/Schaffer 2009: 3).
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Joachim Betz/Melanie Hanif: An Analysis of India's Domestic and Foreign Energy Policy
The domestic necessity of developing a cost-efficient energy strategy while sustaining subsidies as well as the ambitious growth and distributional targets limits India's room to maneuver at the international level (Joshi 2009: 4) . Internationally, the country's dependence on only four countries (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kuwait, and Iran), which account for nearly two-thirds of India's oil imports, understandably causes concern on the part of the Indian government, particularly against the background of the special value of self-reliance discussed above. Since energy independence is not a realistic option in the near future, the current situation has produced a strong preference for the diversification of energy sources and At the same time, India's policy is causing friction with Western countries-either because the supplying countries are politically unacceptable to the latter or because the latter countries themselves have claims at stake. As described above, however, its traditional friend-foe patterns make India less responsive to the political or ideological reservations of the West (Ganguly/Pardesi 2009).
The structural variable of shrinking international oil and gas reserves is likely to add to India's preference for tapping new sources. On the other hand, it will probably also augment the level of confrontation between India and its competitors for energy resources (mainly the established powers and China) and thus limit India's freedom of action on the international stage. Although India and China agreed on the joint exploration and development of new energy resources and technologies in 2005, the two countries are considered to be in a competition for energy supplies (Government of India 2005b: 64; Khurana 2009 ). China normally dominates in this competition because it supplements oil and gas agreements with development credits at highly concessionary rates. This could explain why India is already working 11
Claims in more attractive sites were already distributed to multinational companies when India became active.
at improving its domestic leverage while continuing to play the hardliner in international negotiations, especially when it comes to international greenhouse gas reduction targets. As the developed countries still have higher emission levels than India and as they are primarily responsible for global warming (IEA 2006: 199) , India's nay-saying policy also has a normative foundation. But despite its resistance to internationally agreed-upon greenhouse gas reduction targets, the Indian government has put forward an impressive list of measures to save energy, 12 to reduce transmission losses, 13 to streamline energy prices, 14 to reduce the energy intensity of production, 15 and to develop local 16 and renewable 17 energy sources. If all these opportunities were seized, India's energy demand could be cut by approximately 35 percent by 2030; its greenhouse gas emissions would be expected to decrease at the same rate (Government of India 2007: 50).
Conclusions
This paper has shown that a two-level game approach is suitable for shedding new light on India's energy policy. The "double-edged" nature of India's energy policy has become most obvious through Indian policy makers' attempts to use the increasing cost of energy subsi-
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In order to save energy within companies and public offices, energy audits were made mandatory. The new Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) will set energy-saving norms for 15 energy-intensive sectors. The smallscale sector, which is responsible for 70 percent of industrial greenhouse gas emissions has, however, not been included yet due to administrative difficulties (Government of India 2007). 14 Electricity costs for corporate customers in India are higher than in most countries at a similar stage of development. This is the result of cross-subsidization to the benefit of poor clients and agriculture as well as the previously mentioned transmission losses (Herd 2007: 204 Energy intensity in India has dropped considerably (by 50 percent since the 1970s) and already compares with that of China. There is, however, still scope for improvement, especially concerning coal power plants, heavy industries, and the private and public transport of passengers and goods.
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As a local energy source to be developed, nuclear energy, particularly the enrichment of thorium, takes pride of place in official statements (cf. Government of India 2007). Hydropower is also classified as an ecological sound source. However, because of the dislocation of people that results, its exploitation is often met with popular dissent. Therefore, additional capacity from hydropower is modest. The same holds true for the development of wind and solar energy (Planning Commission 2006a: 13, 33, 36-38) , although India has considerable potential in these fields (Friedman/Schaffer 2009 ).
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The Indian government plans to add 13,500 MW of renewable power during the current Eleventh Plan period (Government of India 2007). The greatest share of this will be made up of wind energy. Overall, the nonconventional energy sector is still largely underdeveloped. It is therefore very unlikely that nonconventional sources will have a significant influence on energy availability in India (Madan 2007: 87) .
dies and the country's dependence on foreign supplies to contain domestic demands for stable and low prices. On the international stage, the same politicians have played the domestic card by arguing that India is unable to meet international emissions standards because of domestic resistance to the adoption of an energy-saving development strategy (Brookings 2006: 21) . The analytical framework we have developed here on the basis of the existing literature on two-level games in international relations has enabled us to consider both the national and the international exigencies which have an impact on India's choices in the energy realm, as well as its attempt to balance these sometimes contradicting forces in light of the government's internal and external power position. In this vein, India's energy policy can be explained as the result of the interaction of domestic factors and relatively stable traditional foreign policy orientations on the one hand and international factors and pressures on the other hand.
The two-level game approach maintains that international agreements will only be achieved if domestic and foreign win-sets overlap (Putnam 1988: 438 ). India's domestic winset is characterized particularly by its desire for self-reliance, its traditional friend-foe patterns, the legacy of its mixed-economy model, and a paradoxically fragmented but equally overintegrated institutional apparatus. Another decisive factor shaping India's domestic winset is the fact that groups of consumers (mainly low-and medium-income households) and the farmers' community, whose sheer electoral size decides the fate of incumbent governments, have-more than is the case elsewhere-become accustomed to low prices for electricity, oil, and gas. This considerably narrows India's domestic win-set and thus the chances of international agreement on energy or climate issues. The comparatively soft position of the Indian government vis-à-vis its domestic constituencies weakens its ability to follow through with necessary price adjustments in the energy sector and the implementation of measures to reduce the energy intensity of industrial and agricultural production. Altogether, the particularities of India's current political and socioeconomic makeup, as well as its position as an emerging economy and an energy latecomer, dampen the prospects of consensus with established powers in energy and climate negotiations. However, if the domestic and international dynamics are rather divergent, as is currently the case with Indian energy policy, the question is which arena prevails. Here our findings support Alons's claim that internal necessities tend to dominate foreign policy when internal polarity, that is, the extent to which the government dominates society, is low and power in the international system is relatively decentralized. 18 18 Alons's hypotheses were developed for liberal middle-sized democracies such as Germany or Canada and are therefore not applicable to the Indian case on a one-to-one basis. Nevertheless, the question of how our findings fit into Alons's polarity framework and whether our mixed result for internal polarity in India are representative of other emerging powers could be a direction for further studies in the tradition of the two-level game.
Thus domestic necessities, which have been overshadowed by the overall goal of sustaining economic growth, have resulted in India's policy of seeking adjustment at the international rather than the national level. Instead of, for instance, developing energy-saving policies or alternative, nonfossil fuels, India has tried to address its scarcity of domestic resources by adopting a confrontational external energy-policy strategy. This, however, brings about difficulties at the international level, mainly in the form of disadvantageous competition with China and the alienation of Western powers, which India has provoked by cooperating with states such as Myanmar and Iran or by rejecting responsibility for global warming. These sites of confrontation are not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.
Notwithstanding these potential causes of conflict, our findings have to be viewed from the perspective of India's quest for improved status in the international arena, which demands enhanced cooperation between India and the United States in particular. Signs of a more cooperative attitude towards the West have become increasingly visible, for example, through India's vote with the US against Iran within the International Atomic Energy Agency or through its attempts to gain international acknowledgment of its nuclear power status.
These developments can be interpreted as indications that India will handle internal and external energy-policy constraints in a more balanced way in the future. Indeed, the Indian government has recently tried to broaden its domestic leverage by reducing those constraints that arise from the inefficient use of energy by both private and commercial consumers in India. Subsidies have proven to be a major hindrance to efforts to improve energy efficiency.
The wasteful use of energy as well as the exploration and exploitation of new sites with marginal value are the consequences thereof. Reforming the Indian energy sector is, however, difficult because of its nontransparency and the many actors involved who benefit from the current system. This again emphasizes the fact that the institutional apparatus is a crucial variable in India's double-edged energy policy.
To summarize, our analysis of the first phase of the two-level game has revealed the ideational, economic, and institutional sources of India's energy-policy preferences. It has, furthermore, outlined how these preferences combine to form an energy strategy. We would like to encourage more detailed studies of the bargaining processes in the international context, both in energy and in climate politics. 19 Comparing India's positions and the outcomes of specific bargaining situations to the general preferences identified in this paper appears to be a promising topic for future research.
19 Narlikar (2006) offers a general account of India's international bargaining behavior, with an empirical focus on trade negotiations. This could provide a basic framework for enquiring into India's role in international energy politics.
